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Abstract
Background: The decision to initiate or maintain a healthy habit, such as physical activity involves a trade-off
between a short-term cost, such as time and effort, which are commonly identified as barriers to physical activity,
and a long-term health benefit. Research suggests that individual time preference may be associated with
unhealthy behaviors. However, empirical evidence of this for physical activity is scant. This study investigated the
relationship between time preference and physical activity, and how this might influence behavior change.
Methods: Employees (n = 176; mean age 42.2 years) who participated in a physical activity intervention were
invited to take part in a behavioral economic field experiment. Two economic experiments, using multiple price
lists and monetary trade-off tables involving real money choices, were conducted face-to-face with participants to
measure the two components of time preference, namely present-bias and discount rate. Together with individual
risk preferences, these three variables were jointly estimated by maximum likelihood. These three parameters were
expressed as a linear function of the levels of physical activity while controlling for socio-demographic variables
within the same maximum likelihood framework.
Results: Those who were present-biased and who had higher discount rates did significantly less physical activity
than their patient and non present-biased counterparts. A 3% lower discount rate and 1.14 unit decrement in the
present-bias parameter was associated with a 30min increase of physical activity per week. This negative association
was more significant for certain sub-groups, such as younger and married adults and those with higher staff grade and
those who have children. Participants who dropped out of the study earlier were more present-biased.
Conclusions: Results demonstrated that discount rate and present-biasedness have a significant impact on physical
activity levels. Such concepts have been largely overlooked and underutilized in physical activity interventions.
Promising implications include 1) utilizing individuals’ time preferences to better target interventions; 2) taking account
of time preferences in the intervention design; 3) interventions attempting to correct for present-biasedness.
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Background
Due to adverse trends in lifestyles factors, such as phys-
ical inactivity and sedentary living, healthcare systems
globally are facing a budgetary precipice because of an
inexorable growth in related conditions such as diabetes.
Thus policy makers are calling for a major re-think
about how to reverse these trends if we are to have any
hope of improving health and sustaining viable healthcare
for an aging population [1]. Changing health-related be-
haviors is not straight forward and there have been a num-
ber of high level government reports [2], and influential
academic literature that invokes the need to seek innova-
tive and effective interventions by integrating much
broader behavioral economics, psychological and socio-
ecological theories [3–5]. If an effective recipe for such
interventions can be found, the potential dividend is sub-
stantial [6].
However, in practice most of us struggle to lead
healthy lives but the question of what role governments
should play in encouraging us to do the right thing is
contested, and some governments (including the UK,
Australia and Norway) have opted for policy “nudges”
that change the choice architecture, to make the healthier
choices the easier ones [7]. In particular, the UK Govern-
ment has supported the role of behavioral economics (i.e.
the intersection of psychology and economics) [7]. Such
approaches have shown potential in public health [8];
however, we know little about how best to utilize and
“exploit” such approaches for population level behavior
change.
Time preferences, which refers to the extent to which
delayed and larger rewards are preferred over immediate
and smaller rewards (e.g. Would you choose $100 today
or $150 one year from today?), is of particular import-
ance in designing public health interventions [9–16]. In
a major contribution to time preference theory, Lowen-
stein and Prelec (1992) decomposed time preferences
into two elements, namely level of discount rates and
time-inconsistent discounting [17]. The former refers to
the general level of discount rate of a participant (e.g. an
individual is said to have a discount rate of 50% if the in-
dividual is indifferent between $100 received now and
$150 received one year from now) whereas the latter re-
fers to the phenomenon that an individual’s discount
rate in the short-term is high and declines as the period
of waiting lengthens (e.g. an individual are indifferent
between $100 received now and $150 received one year
from now but may show strong preference to receive
$150 in two years over $100 in a year). This contrasts
with time consistent discounting where an individual’s
level of impatience is constant over time. Time inconsist-
ency produces what is known as a present-biasedness, an
apparent dynamic inconsistency between the preferences
of the short-term and long-term self. O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999) recognize that “people grab immediate re-
wards and avoid immediate costs in a way our long run
selves do not appreciate” [18]. Present-biasedness is also
referred to as the self-control problem [5], the procrastin-
ation problem [3], or the short term-self versus long
term-self problem [4].
Of significance in this regard is the growing literature
on how certain health behaviors are related to an indi-
vidual’s discount rate and level of present-bias. Research
has shown that patient individuals who were more con-
cerned with their future or long-term self ’s preferences
were more likely to exhibit behaviors associated with
positive health consequences—such as physical activity
and seeking preventive healthcare—and less likely to
procrastinate in adopting healthy behaviors or in exhibit-
ing behaviors associated with negative health conse-
quences from a lack of self-control—such as eating
unhealthy foods and smoking [19]. The public health
implications of this are very significant as present-biased
individuals exhibit problems of self-control and are un-
likely to forego present gratification for future health
benefit unless present incentives are paid. This may
work for one-off or infrequent behaviors, for example
vaccination, screening or specialist appointments, but
for repetitive daily behavior such as physical activity, en-
gagement of present-biased individuals may wane with-
out a high level of constant incentives. With respect to
repetitive behaviors with long term health benefits,
present-biased individuals may suffer not only from initi-
ation of the health behavior but also problems of main-
tenance, both of which are referred to generically as
commitment problems.
Several recent studies have found that higher discount
rate or present-biasedness was negatively associated with
participation in physical activity [20–24]. However, par-
simonious proxy measures (e.g. accumulation of credit
card debt) were used to measure time preference and
the two related yet distinct elements of time preference
(discount rate and present-biasedness) were not distin-
guished [20, 23, 24]. Mørkbak et al. (2017) [21] elicited
time preference using non-incentive compatible ques-
tions. In contrast, Conell-Price and Jamison (2015) [22]
reported that more “myopic” individuals (with a bias for
the present) exercised more, a conclusion that may be
partially explained by exercise providing immediate
gratification, in contrast to the view of exercise as a
“future-oriented” preventive health behavior, which is
standard in the literature. However, their findings may
be partially attributable to their measurement of time
preference (i.e. a single hypothetical question). Further-
more, none of these studies has utilized objectively mea-
sured physical activity. Thus, more in-depth study is
necessary to reach a firm conclusion on the association
between time preference and physical activity.
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Recent reviews have demonstrated evidence of the ef-
fectiveness of financial incentives in changing at least
some health behaviors [25]. The immediacy of the re-
wards in such interventions can essentially ‘override’ an
individual’s present-bias by incentivizing the participant
to undertake the health behavior now, which has health
benefits in the future. This immediate reward may be ef-
fective in overcoming present-bias for one-off or infre-
quent compliance behavior but may fail to ensure
retention in repetitive behavior unless habit formation
quickly takes place or an effective form of compliance
management is put in place.
Furthermore, different time discounting behavior (ex-
ponential or hyperbolic) may be more or less aligned to
different types of preventive health-related behaviors
among different types of people, and so in the context of
a financial incentive intervention, different incentive
structures may be required either to initiate behavior
change in the short term or to maintain it in the longer
term [26]. For example, physical activity participation
may have short term wellbeing gains (e.g. enhanced
mood) and losses (e.g. loss of time, fatigue, soreness)
and longer-term health benefits whereas smoking cessa-
tion has much larger short term wellbeing losses, no
short term gains, and coupled with longer term health
gains; and it is conceivable to hypothesize that the same
discounting function might not align equally well with
participants exhibiting these two behaviors.
Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the
association of time preferences on health behaviors and
health behavior change, primarily for physical activity
behavior, in the context of a quasi-experimental trial of a
workplace financial incentive scheme to promote phys-
ical activity [27]. The intervention aimed to promote
physical activity, including walking which is one of the
most accessible forms of physical activity [28]. We hy-
pothesized that those who maintained regular physical
activity in the intervention were less present-biased,
more patient individuals (and thus more concerned with
long-term health and financial benefits), whereas in-
active individuals are more present-biased and impatient
and discount both types of future benefits more heavily.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
investigate the association by measuring time prefer-
ence through a series of economic experiments using
real money, by jointly estimating discount rates and
present-biasedness along with risk preferences [29, 30]
and by using an objective measure of physical activity.
Methods
The physical activity loyalty (PAL) scheme
The Physical Activity Loyalty (PAL) card scheme (12-week
intervention) was a quasi-experimental study where 406
office-based employees from a workplace setting (public
sector organization) were each given a loyalty card to
monitor their physical activity levels (mainly workplace
walking but other forms of physical activity such as run-
ning, cycling, use of the gym were included) during office
hours, by swiping their card at sensors placed along
designated routes within the grounds of their workplace
(office buildings based in an extensive natural parkland)
[27]. Participants were randomly allocated to either an
Incentive or No Incentive group. For the Incentive
Group, minutes of physical activity were converted into
points and these points could be redeemed for rewards
(retail vouchers) sponsored by local businesses. The
study collected data on socio-demographic characteris-
tics, objectively measured physical activity (measured as
per 100 min of physical activity per week across the
12-week intervention period), retention, self-reported
physical activity (Global Physical Activity Questionnaire
(GPAQ)) and quality of life (EuroQol 5D). In summary,
the study found a trend for ‘modest’ short term in-
creases in physical activity levels and quality of life
among those receiving financial incentives [27].
The field experiments
A random sub-sample of participants from the inter-
vention (Intervention Group) were invited via email
(representative sample regarding age, gender and staff
grade) to participate in the behavioral economic field
experiments after the six month data collection period.
A further random sample of participants (in the same
workplace) that did not take part in the intervention
was invited to participate (Control Group), creating a
larger sample size to better identify the discount func-
tion which characterizes participants’ time preferences.
No further eligibility criteria were applied. A total of
176 participants took part in the field experiments,
among which n = 95 were from the Intervention Group
(PAL-scheme participants) and n = 81 from the Con-
trol Group (i.e. non PAL-scheme participants). Those
expressing an interest in participating were invited to
one of the lunchtime sessions. These sessions were fa-
cilitated by trained members of the research team, in-
volved 8–16 participants on each occasion and took on
average 45 min. Prior to taking part, participants con-
firmed that they had read and understood the Partici-
pant Information Sheet and provided written informed
consent. Participants were asked to complete a short
questionnaire regarding socio-demographic character-
istics. Briefly, 58.5% (n = 103) of the sample were fe-
male, mean age 42.2 years (SD 9.9), 77% (n = 135) were
single, 67% (n = 118) had no children and 16.5% (n = 29)
were current smokers (see Table 1). The cohort was
broadly representative of those employed within the
workplace.
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Elicitation of time preference
To elicit individuals’ time preference, participants were
presented with multiple price lists which offered a
choice between two monetary amounts (Option A and
Option B) (see Additional file 1: Appendix A) [29]. Op-
tion A paid a smaller amount whilst Option B offered a
larger amount after a longer delay. Each multiple price
list consisted of 10 choices between A and B; the sooner
amount (Option A) and the delay to receiving Option B
remained constant, however progressing down each
choice task the interest rate, or reward, for delay in-
creased. According to their time preferences, some par-
ticipants will accept a smaller reward for a given delay.
Six choice tasks corresponding to six different time de-
lays (one month, two months, three months, four
months, five months and six months) were used. Each
participant was presented with only three time delays
randomly chosen from the six to limit the length of ses-
sions since participants were allowed to have up to one
hour of lunch time during which experiments were orga-
nized. The three chosen time horizons (in a random
order) were presented with one-month front end delay
(FED, i.e. imposing a delay to both the early and late
payment dates) and non-FED, respectively, leading to six
choice tasks for each participant. The one month
front-end delay treatment was used to avoid the poten-
tial problem of extra transaction cost with Option B
(which. Includes, credibility of the future money actually
being paid etc.). The starting principle for each choice
task was £250 (approximately $375) which is comparable
to previous similar studies [29].
To ensure that decisions for the tasks were fully incen-
tivized, each participant had a 10% chance of receiving
real monetary payments based on their decisions in
these tasks. Each participant rolled a 10-sided die and
received actual payment if they rolled a 1. A 6-sided die
was then rolled to determine which multiple price list
was selected to be paid out, followed by a 10-sided die
to determine which decision within the list was paid
(maximum payment approximately $487). The partici-
pant then received the payment that corresponded to
their decision in this task. The immediate payments
were paid at the end of the sessions by cheques; the de-
layed payments were paid by posting cheques to the ad-
dresses chosen by the participants at the appropriate
time delay.
Elicitation of risk preference
Participants’ risk preferences need to be controlled for to
avoid upward-biases to the time preference estimates [29].
To elicit risk preferences, participants were presented with
a single multiple price list that consisted of 10 decisions
between two lotteries (Option A or Option B) [31]. Each
lottery offered a chance to receive a larger or smaller
amount of money (See Additional file 1: Appendix B). In
the first example, Option A was a lottery consisting of a
10% chance of receiving £140 (~$210) and a 90% chance
of receiving £80 (~$120). The difference between Option
A and B is that Option B was more risky and had a higher
large amount ($300) and a lower small amount ($30). As
the participant moved down the 10 decisions in the list
the chance of receiving the larger amount in both lotteries
increased. For example, a risk neutral participant (choos-
ing solely on expected earnings) would prefer Option A
up to choice 5 where they would be indifferent between A
and B and from Option 6 onward they would prefer
Option B. Furthermore, so-called “risk loving” participants
prefer the higher maximum payoff lottery with lower
minimum payment (even with smaller expected payoff, i.e.
selecting Option B in choices before choice 5) while “risk
averse” participants prefer the higher minimum payment
lottery with lower maximum payment (even choosing
smaller expected payoffs, i.e. selecting Option A in choices
after choice 5).
Table 1 Sample characteristics (N = 176)
Characteristics Grouping criteria N (%) Control Group Intervention Group Tests of differences p-value
Gender Male 73 (41.4%) 38 35 Chi2 (1) = 1.83 0.18
Female 103 (58.5%) 73 60
Age Mean 42.2 40.5 43.6 t(174, 2) = − 2.12 0.04
Staff grade If staff grade = G5+,G6,G7,DP,SO (higher staff grade) 90 (51.1%) 33 57 Chi2 (1) = 6.49 0.01
If staff grade = EOI,EOII,AO,AA 86 (48.9%) 48 38
Smoker Current smoker 29 (16.5%) 19 10 Chi2 (1) = 5.31 0.02
Current non-smoker 147 (83.5%) 62 85
Marital Status Single 135 (76.7%) 19 22 Chi2 (1) = 0.00 0.96
Couple 41 (23.3%) 62 73
Child Has child/children 58 (33%) 30 28 Chi2 (1) = 1.13 0.29
No child/children 118 (67%) 51 67
Note: Staff-grade was segmented near the mean to have near equal sample sizes
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Similar to the time preference tasks, a 10-sided die was
rolled to determine if each participant received payment in
the risk preference tasks, with participants receiving pay-
ment if a 1 was rolled. A second 10-sided die was rolled to
determine the pay-out choice and payment was deter-
mined by a third throw for the chosen lottery (maximum
payment $300). Any payments won in the risk preference
tasks were separate to the time preference tasks and were
paid by cheques at the end of the field experiment session.
Additional file 1: Appendix F presents a flow diagram
to explain the study processes.
Statistical analyses
The analyses followed a three-step procedure. Firstly,
the generalized hyperbolic discount function which nests
exponential and hyperbolic discounting and has two
components, i.e. present-biasedness and level of discount
rate, was jointly estimated with risk preferences by max-
imum likelihood (ML) (See Additional file 1: Appendix C
for a detailed description of the econometric framework).
A significantly different from zero present-bias parameter
indicates hyperbolic discounting. Data used for the ML es-
timation included responses on six discounting rate tasks
and one risk preference task for each participant from the
whole sample (total n = 176; n = 95 from the Intervention
Group and n = 81 from the Control Group (i.e. no inter-
vention)). Since each task involved a series of 10 binary
choices, this resulted in 12,320 observations. Secondly, the
associations between the levels of physical activity and the
three parameters (present-biasedness, discount rate and
risk preferences) for the Intervention Group were tested
by a one-stage approach which estimated the three param-
eters as a linear function of the levels of physical activity
while controlling for socio-demographic variables in the
same maximum likelihood framework. Next, it was tested
whether the associations between physical activity and
time preferences were different across sub-groups of the
Intervention Group including age, gender, staff-grade and
other household characteristics. Finally, the association
between time preferences, risk preferences and trial re-
tention was investigated by constructing an ordinal
variable with four categories: 0 = if a participant never
used the PAL scheme (0 mins/week throughout the
12-week intervention); 1 = if a participant did some
physical activities (> 0 mins/week) during the initial 4
weeks of the intervention but had 0 min for the rest of
the intervention; 2 = if a participant did some physical
activities in week 1–4 and week 5–8 but had 0 min for
the rest of the intervention; 3 = if participants had some
physical activities throughout the intervention.
All data were analyzed using Stata version 13. The
study was approved by the School of Medicine, Dentistry
and Biomedical Sciences Research Ethics Committee,
Queen’s University Belfast (Ref: 11/01v1).
Results
Hyperbolic versus exponential discount function for the
whole sample
Table 2 presents the estimated discount function as-
suming risk aversion for the whole sample including
both Control and Intervention groups. When risk aver-
sion was assumed, discount rate was estimated to be
0.29, substantially smaller than the Figure (0.53) obtained
under the risk neutrality condition. Furthermore, present-
biasedness was significantly and robustly larger than zero,
irrespective of risk aversion ([β=3.23 (SE = 0.57); p < 0.01])
or neutrality ([β=3.13 (SE = 0.56); p < 0.01]), suggesting
Table 2 Estimations of discount rate and present-biasedness for the whole sample
Parameters Estimate Standard error Lower 95% confidence interval Upper 95% confidence interval
A. Assuming risk aversion
Discount rate (β) 0.29 0.03 0.22 0.35
Present-biasedness (α) 3.23 0.57 2.12 4.35
Risk preference (γ) 0.61 0.08 0.45 0.76
μRA 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.15
μDR 0.30 0.13 0.04 0.56
Log likelihood − 6411.17
Number of observations 12,320
B. Assuming risk neutrality
Discount rate (β) 0.53 0.04 0.45 0.60
Present-biasedness (α) 3.13 0.56 2.03 4.23
μDR 8.87 0.58 7.73 10.00
Log likelihood − 6745.38
Number of observations 12,320
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level
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that time-inconsistent discounting fitted the data better
than exponential discounting.
The estimated discount rates and present-biasedness
parameters were used to predict discount rates over
time. Additional file 1: Appendix D and E present the
summary statistics and fitted discount rates spread over
horizons that assume risk aversion and risk neutrality,
respectively. It can be seen that time preferences de-
crease with length of horizons (delays) in both cases.
Further, similar to Andersen et al. (2008) [29], time pref-
erence estimates decreased dramatically after controlling
for risk preference. Therefore, the generalized hyperbolic
discount function, controlled for risk preference, was
used in subsequent analyses.
Association between discount rate, present-biasedness,
and physical activity behavior of the intervention group
Table 3 shows the association between minutes of object-
ively measured physical activity and present-biasedness,
discount rate, and risk preference for the Intervention
Group while controlling for socio-demographic variables.
Findings demonstrated that a higher level of physical
Table 3 The association between time preferences and physical activity (100 mins/week) and socio-demographics
Variables Coefficient 95% CI Standard error t-value
Dependent variable: Discount rate (β)
PAL minutes − 0.091b [−0.171,-0.012] 0.041 −2.26
Old −0.036 [−0.116,0.044] 0.041 −0.88
Male 0.057 [−0.016,0.130] 0.037 1.54
Household income − 0.039 [− 0.091,0.013] 0.026 −1.47
Single −0.138b [−0.263,-0.013] 0.064 −2.17
Child −0.134c [− 0.217,-0.051] 0.042 −3.17
Own house 0.097b [0.007,0.186] 0.046 2.12
Constant 0.339c [0.114,0.563] 0.114 2.96
Dependent variable: Present-biasedness (α)
PAL minutes −3.790c [−5.990,-1.591] 1.122 −3.38
Old −2.607c [−3.948,-1.266] 0.684 −3.81
Male 1.296 [−0.277,2.869] 0.803 1.61
Household income −0.888a [−1.796,0.020] 0.463 − 1.92
Single −3.619b [−6.697,-0.542] 1.570 −2.31
Child −2.533c [−4.058,-1.008] 0.778 −3.26
Own house 5.537c [2.398,8.676] 1.601 3.46
Constant 5.745b [0.959,10.531] 2.442 2.35
Dependent variable: Risk preference (γ)
PAL minutes −0.102c [− 0.177,-0.027] 0.038 −2.68
Old −0.007 [−0.096,0.082] 0.046 −0.16
Male 0.003 [−0.069,0.075] 0.037 0.08
Household income 0.003 [−0.038,0.044] 0.021 0.16
Single 0.065 [−0.029,0.160] 0.048 1.35
Child −0.014 [−0.103,0.076] 0.046 −0.30
Own house 0.060 [−0.069,0.189] 0.066 0.91
Constant 0.770c [0.452,1.087] 0.162 4.74
μRA 0.145c [0.085,0.205] 0.031 4.76
μDR 0.099 [−0.076,0.274] 0.089 1.11
Log likelihood − 3371.89
Number of observations 6650
Notes: PAL minutes is measured as per 100 min of physical activity per week across the 12-week intervention period; Old equals 1 if the participants is older than
40, otherwise 0; Male takes the value of 1 if the participant is male, 0 otherwise; Household income takes five values: 1 (below £15,000), 2 (£15,000 - £29,999), 3
(£30,000 - £ 49,999), 4 (£50,000 - £ 79,999), 5 (£ 80,000 or more); Single equals 1 if the participant is single, otherwise 0; Child takes the value of 1 if the participant
has at least one child, otherwise 0; Own house takes the value of 1 if the participant owns a house, otherwise 0; aindicates 10%, bindicates 5% and cindicates 1%.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level
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activity (PAL minutes) was significantly associated with
lower discount rates [− 0.091 (0.041); p < 0.05], suggesting
that a 2.73% point increase in discount rate was associated
with 30min decrease in physical activity per week.
Another important contribution of our analysis is
that present-biasedness was also found to be negatively
associated with level of physical activity [(− 3.790
(1.122); p < 0.01], indicating that a 1.14 unit increase of
present-biasedness (self-control problems) was associ-
ated with 30 min decrease in physical activity. Finally,
we also observed that risk aversion was negatively related
to levels of physical activity [− 0.102 (0.038); p < 0.01].
Table 3 also reports the association between the socio-
demographic variables and discount rates and present-bia-
sedness. It can be seen that those who were single and
had child/children had significantly lower discount rates
and were less present-biased whereas the individuals who
owned houses had significantly higher discount rates and
were more present-biased. In addition, those who were
older and had higher household income had significantly
lower levels of present-bias but did not have significantly
different levels of discount rates. Gender was associated
with neither present-bias nor the level of discount rate. Fi-
nally, none of the socio-demographic variables were sig-
nificantly associated with risk preferences.
Association between discount rate, present-biasedness,
and physical activity behavior for sub-groups of the
intervention group
Analyses showing the association between time preferences
and minutes of physical activity for various sub-groups are
presented in Table 4. Results showed that lower discount
rates were significantly associated with physical activity
only among young adults [− 0.141 (0.071); p < 0.10], those
with a higher staff grade [− 0.143 (0.076); p < 0.10], who
are married [− 0.185 (0.064); p < 0.01] and have child/chil-
dren [− 0.202 (0.073); p < 0.01]. For example, this suggests
that an increase of 100min in a young (age < =40) adult’s
physical activity is associated with a 14% decrease in his/
her discount rate. It can be inferred that the association of
discount rates and physical activity is only significant
among some sub-groups but not all. Meanwhile, young
adults [− 4.613 (1.826); p < 0.05], those with a higher staff
grade [− 6.140 (1.610); p < 0.01], who are married [− 5.727
(1.373); p < 0.01] and have child/children [− 6.773 (3.110);
p < 0.05] also show a significant negative association be-
tween present bias and physical activity.
Association between time preferences and trial retention
of the intervention group
Table 5 presents the results of the analyses investigating
the influence of time preferences on individuals’ reten-
tion throughout the trial. Results demonstrated that
those who were more present-biased were less likely to
continue in an intervention and dropped out of the
study earlier [− 1.819 (0.939); p < 0.1]. This is a signifi-
cant finding as it indicates that present-bias continues to
affect retention even after participants have commenced
physical activity so its effect is not wiped out by habit
formation. Despite the correct sign, no significant rela-
tionship was found between trial retention and discount
rates [− 0.048 (0.030); p > 0.10].
Discussion
Utilizing time preferences for behavior change
Our results suggest that understanding time preferences
has implications for physical activity behavior change and
should be utilized to help target interventions more effect-
ively. For example, socio-economic hardships may shorten
people’s time horizons and it has been suggested that low
socio-economic position (SEP) might also relate to present
time orientation and impulsivity [32]. These groups may
benefit from interventions such as financial incentive-based
interventions that help those with high time discount rates
to initiate healthy behaviors with long-term benefits [33] or
interventions that explicitly account for differing time pref-
erences. For example, time preference rates have been used
to set realistic weight-loss goals in overweight and obese
populations [34], and for tailoring communication for pro-
moting healthy eating [35]. Such interventions can frame
messages to heighten the focus on short term benefits, for
example, improved mood and increased energy.
Changing and modifying the effects of time preferences
Changing temporal perspectives that lead to sub-optimal
health choices (i.e. time-inconsistent or present-bias
preferences (a behavioral economics concept, compared
to the neo-classical concept of time-consistent prefer-
ences)) is an emerging topic in public health research
and may have important implications for public health.
Time consistent discounting implies that, in theory,
agents have perfect foresight into the future evolution of
their discount rates and would therefore employ
pre-commitment strategies to enable themselves to com-
mit to an optimal plan. We found that this was not sup-
ported by our study because participants manifested
time-inconsistent discounting. Laibson (1997) developed
the idea of “commitment contracts” to enable individuals
with time inconsistent preferences to make alternative,
optimal choices about current behavior [36]. Recent
studies suggest that time preferences can be changed or
modulated by therapeutic cognitive, behavioral, or struc-
tural environmental manipulation [37]. It is shown that
many people joining gyms choose fixed term member-
ship which can work out to be much more costly than
paying per visit [38]. They also failed to cancel monthly
membership long after use of the gym had ceased. This
appears to provide evidence that new participants were
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using monthly membership as a means of commitment
management in an attempt to increase their physical ac-
tivity participation because they know they are overcon-
fident in their future self control abilities.
Shifting preferences to favor long-term outcomes re-
quires either suppressing or ignoring participant’s desire
for the immediate reward or down-regulating its value
(i.e. shifting attentional resources from “now” to later).
In particular, training cognitive skills such as attention,
working memory, and executive functioning is believed
to be effective in changing time preference biases [39].
Through the simple reframing of a message of a classical
discounting choice as “something now but nothing later”
versus “nothing now but more later” has been shown to
decrease apparent time preferences [39]. It has been ar-
gued that knowledge of self-control problems can modify
effects of present bias [18]. The Temporal Self-regulation
Theory, which suggests that those individuals with stron-
ger executive control are more able to do physical activity
consistently, is a useful model to underpin such interven-
tions [18]. Furthermore, contingency management inter-
ventions [40] provide incremental reinforcement (in the
form of vouchers or other tangible rewards) that is contin-
gent upon repetition of the desired behavior. It forces par-
ticipants to make a choice between “using now” and
“earning no reward later”.
Table 5 Association between time preference and trial retention
Variables Coefficient 95% CI Standard error t-value
Dependent variable: Discount rate (β)
Loyalty −0.048 [− 0.107,0.012] 0.030 −1.57
Old 0.021 [−0.047,0.089] 0.035 0.61
Male −0.026 [−0.096,0.045] 0.036 −0.72
Single −0.167b [−0.306,-0.028] 0.071 −2.36
Child −0.191c [−0.303,-0.078] 0.057 −3.32
Household income −0.030 [−0.074,0.014] 0.023 −1.32
Constant 0.509c [0.187,0.832] 0.164 3.10
Dependent variable: Present-biasedness (α)
Loyalty −1.819a [−3.659,0.022] 0.939 −1.94
Old 1.290 [−0.295,2.875] 0.809 1.60
Male −2.471 [−5.483,0.54] 1.537 −1.61
Single −4.089b [−7.405,-0.773] 1.692 −2.42
Child −4.334c [− 7.593,-1.075] 1.663 −2.61
Household income −0.160 [−0.543,0.222] 0.195 −0.82
Constant 11.045c [3.376,18.715] 3.913 2.82
Dependent variable: Risk preference (γ)
Loyalty −0.031b [− 0.061,-0.001] 0.015 −2.05
Old 0.032 [−0.036,0.101] 0.035 0.92
Male −0.015 [−0.089,0.058] 0.038 −0.41
Single 0.055 [−0.036,0.146] 0.046 1.18
Child −0.014 [−0.098,0.07] 0.043 −0.32
Household income 0.002 [−0.038,0.042] 0.020 0.12
Constant 0.789c [0.512,1.067] 0.142 5.57
μRA 0.142c [0.087,0.197] 0.028 5.07
μDR 0.129 [−0.075,0.333] 0.104 1.24
Log Likelihood − 3376.29
Number of observations 6650
Note: An ordinal variable Loyalty was constructed to indicate retention The four categories included: 0 = if a participant never used the PAL scheme (0 mins/week
throughout the 12-week intervention); 1 = if a participant did some physical activities (> 0 mins/week) during the initial 4 weeks but has 0 min for the rest of the
intervention; 2 = if a participant did some physical activities in both week 1–4 and week 5–8 but 0min for the rest of the intervention; 3 = if participants had some
physical activities throughout the intervention (week 1–4, week 5–8, week 9–12). Number of participants for each category: Category 0 = 17; Category 1 = 15;
Category 2 = 11; Category 3 = 52. aindicates 10%, bindicates 5% and cindicates 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level
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Implications for public health
Our findings, and those of others, suggest that time pref-
erences have significant implications for developing in-
terventions to increase physical activity and improve
public health. Three promising implications include 1)
utilizing individuals’ time preferences to better target be-
havior change interventions for hard to reach sub-groups
with present-biasedness/or high discounting rates; 2) tak-
ing account of time preferences in the design of the inter-
vention, for example, in setting short-term goals tailored
by individual’s time preferences; 3) devising interventions
that attempt to correct for present-biasedness. Such inter-
ventions could help bridge the gap between previous in-
terventions which tended to put too much weight on
costs and benefits that are immediate and too little on
those that are delayed [8]. Interventions of this kind could
potentially improve multiple health outcomes as time
preferences are also associated with health-related behav-
iors other than physical activity, such as eating habits and
smoking [32]. Indeed, these approaches should be more
suitable for changing physical activity behavior given that
the behavior already provides short-term positive benefits
such as improved mood and wellbeing.
Implications for future research
Despite a growing number of trials investigating the as-
sociation between time preferences for physical activity
behavior change and an emerging literature on time
preference interventions [39, 41], few studies have, by
design, harnessed the power of time preferences within
bespoke public health interventions. Theory [41] and a
small number of simulated “experiments” [42, 43] sug-
gest that time preference parameters can mediate the
transmission or adoption of health behaviors. In addition,
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) [18] asserted that where
some present-biased individuals foresee their self-control
problems (referred to sophistication) while others fail to
foresee the problems (referred to naïve), the effects of this
bias can be lessened or increased. Individuals character-
ized by a certain phenotype may respond differently to
commitment contracts, thus future studies should take
this into account.
Strengths and limitations
Key strengths include the use of an objective measure of
physical activity and economic experiments with real
monetary payments which have stronger associations
with health behaviors than hypothetical methods and
self-reported measures [11]. Although, this objective
measure has not been validated to date, it was supple-
mented with the GPAQ which is a well-validated
self-report measure. Further, the estimation of discount
rates and present-biasedness were controlled for risk
preferences by joint estimations to eliminate upward
biases caused by separate estimations of these variables
[29]. However, as this was cross-sectional data we were un-
able to establish the stability of these measures. Substantial
incentives in the form of cash presented in these elicitation
processes ensured that participants responded carefully and
truthfully in comparison to hypothetical elicitations where
the considerable effort required in the process is not related
to real rewards. However, results from the sub-group ana-
lyses should be interpreted with caution due to the smaller
sample size, and may not be generalizable to physical activ-
ity outside of the workplace setting and in the wider popu-
lation. Our study utilizes cross-sectional data; further
research analyzing longitudinal data will be required in
order to infer causality. Further, although the intervention
was designed to promote physical activity, the majority of
participants undertook walking and so the results may not
be generalizable to other forms of physical activity.
Conclusion
The decision to initiate or maintain a healthy habit, such
as physical activity (in this case workplace physical ac-
tivity) involves a trade-off between a short-term cost,
such as time and effort, which are commonly identified
as barriers to physical activity, and a long-term health
benefit. Understanding individuals’ time preferences
can therefore inform appropriate interventions to ad-
dress health behaviors. Results demonstrated that dis-
count rate and present-biasedness were negatively
associated with physical activity levels and the impact is
more significant for specific sub-groups, for example,
younger adults. Present-biasedness was shown to be re-
lated to trial retention which is at the core of time in-
consistent preferences and resolving the different
preferences of the short term and long term self. Our
research suggests that future physical activity interven-
tions should take account of individuals’ time prefer-
ences including present-biasedness and incorporate
these into intervention design, such as goal setting, in-
centive levels and framing of messages. Failure to iden-
tify present-biased, impatient individuals, who are the
most likely to form sub-optimal (self ) commitment plans
due to overconfidence, procrastination and self-control
problems, will lead to interventions that continue to be
(largely) unsuccessful in the long term. We argue that be-
havioral economic concepts such as discount rate and
present-bias have been largely overlooked and underuti-
lized to date in designing public health interventions and
could shed light on important factors contributing to up-
take and maintenance of healthy behaviors.
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